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 Abstract 
 Congress has become infamous for its lack of understanding of technology, 
particularly with the Facebook and Google hearings in 2018. To improve this 
understanding, this thesis argues for the return of the Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA), a congressional support agency created in 1972 that provided science and 
technology expertise to Congress until its termination in 1995. It also considers potential 
changes that might be made to the old OTA model and the political environment in which 
a new OTA would need to survive. 
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2 
Introduction  
 “The Office of WHAT?” So read the headline of one 1991 column in the San 
Diego Union that profiled the Office of Technology Assessment.1 The title of this thesis 
might elicit a similar reaction.  
The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) was a congressional support agency 
created in 1972 whose basic mandate was to keep Congress informed on technological 
developments and their possible impacts on public policy and society.2 Not recognizing 
its name is forgivable; its main products were dense academic studies that often exceeded 
100 pages. I use the past tense to describe it because Congress cut off its appropriations 
and laid off all its staff in 1995.3 Its authorizing legislation from 1972 remains on the 
books, however.4 Congress should restore the OTA in some form, perhaps updated from 
its 1995 incarnation, to keep lawmakers informed on the emerging technologies of our 
time. 
 An overview of the OTA’s structure and mission is first necessary to understand 
why Congress needs it. The OTA was led by a Director, appointed by a governing board 
called the Technology Assessment Board (TAB).5 The TAB was made up of six House 
members and six senators, evenly divided between the majority and minority parties 
regardless of party control of Congress, and the Director.6 The president pro tempore of 
                                               
1 Bruce Bimber, The Politics of Expertise In Congress: The Rise and Fall of the Office of Technology 
Assessment, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), 38. 
2 Technology Assessment Act of 1972, Public Law 92-484, codified at U.S. Code 2 (1972), § 472, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/2/472. 
3 Bimber 77. 
4 Technology Assessment Act of 1972, § 472. 
5 Technology Assessment Act of 1972, § 473. 
6 Ibid. 
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the Senate and the Speaker of the House appointed the members for their chambers.7 Any 
committee or subcommittee chair could submit a study request to the OTA.8 The TAB 
would vote to approve each study request and the funding to carry it out, and finally to 
release the final report to the requesting committees after the assessment had ended.9 The 
OTA also had a peer-review mechanism in the form of the Technology Assessment 
Advisory Council (TAAC), a 12-member board composed of ten experts from academia 
or industry, the Comptroller General of the U.S. (head of the GAO), and the Director of 
the Congressional Research Service.10 
The OTA was the smallest of the legislative support agencies, both in 
appropriations and in staffing.11 Its budget for its last fiscal year, FY 1995, was $22 
million, or about $37 million in 2019 dollars.12 $37 million would be less than 1% of FY 
2019 federal spending on the legislative branch, which accounted for less than 0.5% of 
federal discretionary spending in that fiscal year.13 
The OTA’s mission was uniquely forward-looking. Its authorizing legislation 
defines its “basic function” to be “to provide early indications” of the impacts of 
technology.14 This early-warning function would not only help Congress understand 
technology better, but also encourage more proactive policymaking that addresses public 
                                               
7 Ibid. 
8 Technology Assessment Act of 1972, § 472. 
9 Peter D. Blair, Congress's Own Think Tank: Learning From the Legacy of the Office of Technology 
Assessment (1972–1995). (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 28. 
10 Technology Assessment Act of 1972, § 476. 
11 “Vital Statistics on Congress,” The Brookings Institution, May 21, 2018, 
https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/. 
12 “Vital Statistics on Congress,”; Coinnews Media Group, LLC, “US Inflation Calculator,” accessed April 
24, 2019, https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/. 
13 “Appropriations Watch: FY 2019,” Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, last modified February 
15, 2019, accessed April 25, 2019, http://www.crfb.org/blogs/appropriations-watch-fy-2019. 
14 Technology Assessment Act of 1972, § 472. 
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issues before they become more difficult to manage. This thesis contends that Congress 
sorely needs both knowledge and proactivity. 
In the first chapter, I articulate the case for reviving the OTA by describing the 
problem it would help solve and defending against common arguments against restoring 
it. In the second, I analyze and compare commonly proposed models for a new OTA. In 
the third, I survey the changes in the political climate since 1995 and present ways in 
which they might affect the political feasibility and survivability of a new OTA. In the 
final chapter, I forecast the indirect consequences of a resurrected OTA on congressional 
power dynamics, legislative-executive relations, and general political discourse 
surrounding science and technology issues. 
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Chapter 1: Why Bring Back the OTA? 
1.1. Summary of Argument 
 The case for reviving the OTA involves two broad arguments. The first is that 
other potential sources of technical expertise have atrophied over the past several 
decades, preventing them from filling the gap left by the OTA’s absence. The second 
holds that this shortfall has led to policy blunders and missed opportunities to gather 
information necessary to make informed policy decisions. 
1.2. Other Sources of Expertise Fall Short 
 Why have other sources of information not filled the gap? Consider the major 
sources of information that Congress members consume to inform their decisions: staff, 
legislative support agencies, lobbyists, and think tanks. 
Congressional staff and legislative support agencies are institutionally the closest 
sources of information to Congress members. But both sources have atrophied over the 
past several decades. As of 2015, the House committee staff headcount has fallen by 
about 50 percent from its peak in 1991 and the Senate committee staff roster by 14 
percent from that time.15 House members also collectively have 17% fewer personal staff 
than in 1991, and senators about 9% fewer.16 Furthermore, a greater percentage of 
personal staff in both houses now operate out of district and state offices than in the early 
1990s, reflecting a greater emphasis on constituent casework and campaign management 
                                               
15 “Vital Statistics on Congress,” The Brookings Institution, May 21, 2018, 
https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/, author’s calculation. 
16 Ibid. 
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at home over policy work in Washington.17 The average Washington staffer is now 
responsible for a heavier policy workload, making it difficult for staff to find the time to 
become informed on highly technical issues, let alone brief their bosses on them. 
A similar fate has befallen Congress’s support agencies. Since 1995, the OTA’s 
last year of operation, staff rosters have shrunk by 18 percent at the Congressional 
Research Service and 35 percent at the Government Accountability Office.18 The 104th 
and 105th Congresses, led by Newt Gingrich and the forces of the Republican 
Revolution, oversaw most of the downsizing.19 At the CRS, these cutbacks have 
increased the strain on employees. As with its own staff, Congress has been redirecting 
CRS resources from providing policy expertise to answering constituent questions.20 
Aside from this headcount reduction, as argued in Chapter 2, the missions and areas of 
expertise of the other legislative support agencies differ from those of the OTA such that 
they cannot collectively fill the role that the OTA played. 
The only legislative support agency spared from the staffing cuts has been the 
Congressional Budget Office.21 But even the CBO has been threatened with cuts; two 
introduced amendments to an appropriations bill for FY 2018 would have cut 
appropriations in half and eliminated the CBO’s Budget Analysis division, which would 
have reduced staffing by about one third.22 Though both amendments failed by a wide 
                                               
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Kevin R. Kosar, “Why I Quit the Congressional Research Service,” Washington Monthly 
January/February 2015, https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/janfeb-2015/why-i-quit-the-
congressional-research-service/. 
21 Ibid. 
22 “H.Amdt.217 to H.R.3219,” U.S. Congress, accessed Feb 23, 2019, 
https://www.congress.gov/amendment/115th-congress/house-amendment/217?s=a&r=53; H.Amdt.216 to 
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margin, they both received the support of nearly half of the Republican House majority 
(Democrats voted unanimously against both amendments).23 One amendment that never 
received a vote, introduced by Mark Meadows (R-NC), would have replaced the Budget 
Analysis division’s research with an aggregation of research from four think tanks: the 
Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, and the 
Urban Institute.24 
The Meadows amendment demonstrates the common contention made by 
legislative agency budget cutters that the duties of these agencies can be outsourced to 
think tanks and other private-sector entities. The OTA’s opponents in the mid-1990s 
made similar arguments. The language of the Appropriations Committee report on the 
bill that zeroed the OTA’s funding provides insight into the rhetoric that those in favor of 
doing so used to justify their position: 
The Committee has not provided funds for the Office of Technology Assessment. If 
any functions of OTA must be retained, they shall be assumed by other agencies 
such as Congressional Research Service or the General Accounting Office. 
Alternatively, the National Academy of Sciences, university research programs, 
and a variety of private sector institutions will be available to supplement the 
needs of Congress for objective, unbiased technology assessment.25 
                                               
H.R.3219,” U.S. Congress, accessed Feb 23, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/amendment/115th-
congress/house-amendment/216?s=a&r=54. 
23 “Final Vote Results for Roll Call 417,” U.S., Congress, July 26, 2017, 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2017/roll417.xml; “Final Vote Results for Roll Call 416,” U.S., Congress, July 
26, 2017, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2017/roll416.xml. 
24 Niv Elis, “Meadows: CBO Should Downsize, Aggregate Think Tank Reports,” The Hill, July 24, 2017, 
https://thehill.com/policy/finance/343470-gop-rep-to-push-cbo-budget-cuts. 
25 “H. Rept. 104-141 - Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, 1996,” U.S. House of Representative 
Committee on Approprations, accessed Feb 25, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/congressional-
report/104th-congress/house-report/141, 21. 
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The OTA’s opponents were right that Congress does not lack non-governmental 
sources of policy expertise. There exist more than 1,800 active think tanks in the U.S. as 
of 2018.26 There were also 11,586 federally registered lobbyists as of 2018.27 The 
effective number is far greater because many avoid registration by not meeting some 
components of the legal definition of a lobbyist.28  
 Most of these outside sources of information, however, have a consistent partisan 
agenda. Industry lobbyists, for example, virtually always advocate the policies that 
benefit their industry the most, regardless of their effects on the country as a whole. An 
intuitive problem with aggregating the input of lobbyists is that some interests are 
inevitably better represented than others because some constituencies are better organized 
and have greater access to lobbying resources than others. 
Think tanks also have partisan slants, usually based on political ideology. The 
conservative think tank, for instance, usually favors the market-oriented policy over the 
one requiring heavy government intervention, regardless of the actual merits of the 
policies being compared. The quality and impartiality of research can vary widely 
depending on the think tank, which is undesirable for purposes of rational policymaking. 
Foreign governments, often small countries such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, 
often fund think tanks to produce research to advocate for their interests.29 Furthermore, 
                                               
26 James G. McGann, “2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report,” University of Pennsylvania, Jan 
2019, https://repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks/16/, 36. 
27 Opensecrets.org, “Lobbying Database,” accessed Feb 21, 2019, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/. 
28 Tim LaPira, “How Much Lobbying Is There in Washington? It’s Double What You Think,” The Sunlight 
Foundation, November 25, 2013, https://sunlightfoundation.com/2013/11/25/how-much-lobbying-is-there-
in-washington-its-double-what-you-think/. 
29 Eric Lipton, Brooke Williams, and Nicholas Confessore, “Foreign Powers Buy Influence at Think 
Tanks,” The New York Times, September 6, 2014, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/us/politics/foreign-powers-buy-influence-at-think-tanks.html. 
9 
think tanks are not as responsive to the congressional agenda as the OTA was because 
Congress has no control over their research priorities. The lack of responsiveness can be 
a problem if a highly technical policy issue is under consideration and there is a dearth of 
recent high-quality research on the issue. 
Information from lobbyists and think tanks is an aggregation of many partisan 
viewpoints, meaning more reams of reports and policy papers to cover the same issue 
from different perspectives. All else being equal, a single source of information on a 
given policy issue would take less time and resources on the part of congressional staff to 
read and relay to Congress members than two analyses of the same issue from different 
perspectives. In other words, the OTA may ease the burden on congressional staffers to 
gather information to brief their bosses. 
In sum, the sources of information most responsive to Congress (staff and 
legislative support agencies) have withered, while external sources such as lobbyists and 
think tanks have failed to fill the gap created by the OTA’s termination. The result: a 
congressional ignorance on technology that prevents effective legislation from being 
considered and often spawns dangerously misinformed legislation. Some aptly compare 
this weakening of congressional expertise to a lobotomy.30 
1.3. The Havoc Ignorance Wreaks 
 In the recent past, one demonstration of Congress’s lack of technological 
knowledge came with the 2018 hearings with Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of Facebook, and 
                                               
30 Paul Glastris and Haley Sweetland Edwards, “The Big Lobotomy,” Washington Monthly, June 9, 2014, 
https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/junejulyaug-2014/the-big-lobotomy/. 
10 
Sundar Pichai, CEO of Google. Many questions asked of both CEOs would have been 
answerable or shown to be unreasonable with proper briefing beforehand.31 Some 
lawmakers, for example, showed a lack of understanding of Facebook’s business 
model.32 The time spent on basic questions could have been spent on more substantive 
questions that may have advanced congressional discourse on regulating large technology 
companies. 
 Preparation for hearings may seem outside of the OTA’s role because the OTA’s 
primary output was deep research that would likely not be timely enough to prepare for a 
hearing. The Zuckerberg and Pichai hearings more directly indicate a lack of support 
from staff and from the CRS, the two sources of information that tend to provide quick 
summaries and briefings. But a revived OTA might produce shorter-term deliverables 
than its assessments, as some advocates have suggested.33 The office often produced 
short summaries and reports that complemented the longer assessments.34 Additionally, a 
new OTA might ease pressure on staff and the CRS enough to free resources to brief 
lawmakers more thoroughly. 
 Missed opportunities are not the only negative consequence of Congress’s lack of 
expertise. Congress members have introduced proposals that exhibit ignorance on the 
technology they would regulate. Two examples are the Stop Online Piracy Act and 
PROTECT IP Act, sister bills introduced in 2011 that would have given the Department 
                                               
31 Mallory Locklear, “The Zuckerberg Hearings Were a Wasted Opportunity,” Engadget, April 11, 2018, 
https://www.engadget.com/2018/04/11/zuckerberg-hearings-wasted-opportunity/; Issie Lapowsky, “The 
Sundar Pichai Hearing Was a Major Missed Opportunity,” Wired, December 11, 2018, 
https://www.wired.com/story/congress-sundar-pichai-google-ceo-hearing/. 
32 Locklear. 
33 Peter D. Blair, Congress's Own Think Tank: Learning From the Legacy of the Office of Technology 
Assessment (1972–1995). (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 86. 
34 Ibid 53. 
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of Justice sweeping authority over internet service providers in an attempt to curb 
Internet piracy.35 In the original versions of both bills, the Attorney General could order 
ISPs to block offending websites via DNS (Domain Name Service) blacklisting, which 
prevents the transfer of information from the website’s server to the internet browser.36 
Among the many concerns regarding DNS blacklisting was a potential technical 
problem with forcing ISPs to blacklist. If a user attempts to visit a DNS-blocked site, the 
browser would search for alternate DNS servers until it finds one outside of U.S. 
jurisdiction (e.g., in Canada), upon which the user can access the blocked website.37 This 
process prevents criminals from blocking a hijacked website’s real DNS credentials to 
circumvent the DNS credential system that prevents them from redirecting traffic from 
their hijacked site to a phishing website.38 The implication, opponents of DNS blocking 
argued, was that preventing circumvention required creating a security risk.39 
 It took widespread popular backlash for congressional leadership to agree to 
exclude the DNS language from the bill.40 Though both bills failed because of this 
backlash, the DNS language in their original versions betrays the lack of expert advice 
behind the crafting of the bill.41 The absence of an OTA-like body to provide this advice 
                                               
35 “H.R.3261 - Stop Online Piracy Act,” U.S. Congress, https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-
congress/house-bill/3261; “S.968 - PROTECT IP Act of 2011,” U.S. Congress, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-bill/968. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Stewart Baker, “SOPA-Rope-a-dope,” The Volokh Conspiracy, December 14, 2011, 
http://volokh.com/2011/12/14/sopa-rope-a-
dope/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+volokh%2Fmainfeed+%2
8The+Volokh+Conspiracy%29. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 David Kravets, “Rep. Smith Waters Down SOPA, DNS Redirects Out,” Wired, Jan 13, 2012, 
https://www.wired.com/2012/01/dns-sopa-provision/. 
41 Jennifer Martinez, “SOPA and PIPA Dead, For Now,” POLITICO, Jan 20, 2012, 
https://www.politico.com/story/2012/01/sopa-and-pipa-dead-for-now-071720. 
12 
particularly shows with SOPA and PIPA because the chief sponsors of both bills, Rep. 
Lamar Smith (R-TX) and Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT), were the chairs of the Judiciary 
Committees in their chambers.42 Had the OTA still existed, they could have requested a 
study on the subject of Internet copyright infringement before introducing any legislation. 
It is not even necessary to assume the truth of the DNS blocking concerns to see that key 
lawmakers attempted to regulate something they did not understand. 
 The lack of congressional technology expertise can also manifest as a lack of 
action. For example, Congress might defer to the executive bureaucracy by ensuring that 
the language in proposed legislation is vague enough to allow the bureaucracy to fill in 
the technical details. Doing so would create a dangerous relationship in which Congress 
would not have the expertise to exercise their duty of legislative oversight. In such a 
relationship, Congress depends on the executive bureaucracy’s testimony. This 
dependence creates a bias in favor of funding bureaucratic programs because these 
experts are also the creators and operators of the programs under scrutiny. 
 Such relationships already exist in many areas of regulation, contributing to 
regulatory capture by private industry. For instance, the Federal Aviation Administration 
has outsourced much of its air safety regulatory authority to aircraft manufacturers since 
2005. This delegation might have contributed to the FAA’s certification of the flight 
control system of Boeing’s 737 MAX jets, whose malfunctions have killed hundreds in 
two plane crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia.43 Similarly, the Food and Drug 
                                               
42 Ibid; U.S. Senate, “Committee and Subcommittee Assignments for the One Hundred Twelfth Congress.” 
https://www.senate.gov/committees/committee_assignments.htm. 
43 Dominic Gates, “Flawed Analysis, Failed Oversight: How Boeing, FAA Certified the Suspect 737 MAX 
Flight Control System,” The Seattle Times, March 17, 2019, https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-
aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-
crash/. 
13 
Administration has outsourced much of its regulatory capacity to the pharmaceutical 
companies it is tasked to oversee through user fees, which allow drug manufacturers to 
pay to hire additional FDA personnel to speed up the approval process.44 But reductions 
in review time have been found to result in the approval of more drugs with marginal-at-
best clinical benefit and high rates of adverse side effects.45 
 Key to the persistence of these delegated regulatory systems is the lobbying corps 
of the regulated industries. Because the OTA would compete with and potentially 
displace the biased expertise of lobbyists, restoring the OTA may help loosen the 
regulatory capture of these federal agencies. Additionally, OTA reports might increase 
congressional awareness of the failures of the federal regulatory apparatus and shape 
dialogue around the proper ways to address them. 
 Of course, the causes of regulatory capture and the general undue influence of 
private interests in the regulatory process are far more complex than a lack of technology 
expertise. But a revived OTA may help clear an important barrier to resolving these 
problems. 
1.4. The OTA’s Policy Impact 
 The need for greater knowledge of science and technology may be obvious, but 
some elaboration is necessary on why a revived OTA would provide it. The OTA’s 
influence over the policy process over its 23-year lifespan defies easy detection in part 
                                               
44 Donald W. Light, Joel Lexchin, and Jonathan J. Darrow, “Institutional Corruption of Pharmaceuticals 
and the Myth of Safe and Effective Drugs,” The Journal of Law, Medicine, & Ethics 41:3 (Fall 2013), 595. 
45 Ibid 597. 
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because its reports generally did not give specific policy prescriptions.46 Most of it came 
early in the policymaking process, during which Congress members are evaluating 
problems that might be addressable via legislation.47 The OTA’s low visibility makes it 
an easy target for the argument that its work, academically robust as is may be, does not 
exert a significant enough influence over congressional policymaking to justify the 
resources spent on it. 
But OTA studies have informed policy debates. In a 1975 study, the OTA 
evaluated the Counterforce doctrine, which held that the U.S. nuclear arsenal could target 
strategic military sites instead of population centers.48 Proponents of this concept argued 
that retargeting nuclear weapons in this way would minimize civilian casualties in the 
event of launch while maintaining an effective deterrent.49 John Sparkman (D-AL), then 
chair of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, had requested the study because the 
Department of Defense had asked for funding to implement the Counterforce concept.50 
The OTA report, however, found the DoD’s assumptions unreasonable.51 With the report 
in mind, Sparkman requested that the DoD revise its estimates of civilian casualties with 
“more realistic” assumptions.52 The Counterforce example demonstrates the OTA's 
usefulness as a source of independent verification of claims made by executive agencies, 
which hold an advantage in expertise over Congress. 
                                               
46 Blair 51. 
47 Bruce Bimber, The Politics of Expertise In Congress: The Rise and Fall of the Office of Technology 
Assessment, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), 38. 
48 Ibid 37. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
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OTA reports have also saved the federal government enough money to cover its 
annual budget for decades. OTA advocates often offer the example of the proposed 
Medicare coverage of cholesterol screenings in 1989. An OTA report found little 
evidence that the screenings would detect any new cardiovascular risk factors, which 
influenced Congress’s rejection of legislation that would have given these screenings a 
projected annual range of $1 billion to $5.4 billion in Medicare coverage.53 A 1994 report 
examined the Social Security Administration’s computer procurement strategy and found 
flaws that did not necessarily justify rejecting the procurement altogether, but warranted 
further scrutiny.54 This study informed Congress’s withholding of over $360 million in 
future SSA purchases, granted only on the condition that the SSA prove that it would use 
the new computers to a capacity great enough to justify the expense.55 
In both the Counterforce and cholesterol examples, the OTA filled real gaps in 
Congress's knowledge. To qualify this point, one must remember that Congress members 
sometimes used OTA reports merely as rhetorical ammunition for preexisting policy 
preferences. Bruce Bimber cites the example of Senator John Tower of Texas, who, in 
1977, used OTA reports in rhetoric criticizing President Carter’s energy plan for 
insufficiently supporting domestic oil production.56 Texan oil interests, rather than the 
OTA reports, determined his policy stance. 
I make this qualification to address concerns that lawmakers would exploit a 
revived OTA in this manner. But most OTA assessments targeted issues well outside the 
                                               
53 The Office of Technology Assessment, “Costs and Effectiveness of Cholesterol Screening in the 
Elderly,” April 1989, 1–3. 
54 The Office of Technology Assessment, “The Social Security Administration's Decentralized Computer 
Strategy: Issues and Options,” April 1994, 2. 
55 Bimber 42. 
56 Ibid 36. 
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center of public attention, implying that Congress would be less likely to have expertise 
on it and more likely to use the reports to inform itself rather than rationalize preexisting 
beliefs. Even when OTA studies are used as rhetorical weapons, their lack of partisan 
slant could lead to a more informed debate if both sides of a given policy debate used 
them rhetorically. 
1.5. Perceptions of Bias 
Some have criticized the OTA for a perceived liberal bias, despite the TAB’s 
bipartisan structure.57 Since the OTA’s founding in 1972, conservatives saw liberal bias 
within the OTA. Since its early years, they accused the OTA of serving as a political 
weapon for Senator Edward Kennedy, who strongly supported the OTA and served as 
chair of the TAB four times.58 
 These charges of political bias were more plausible in the OTA’s early years. 
Kennedy sought to be the chair of the first TAB, but the OTA’s authorizing legislation 
barred him from the position because it required that the chair be a House member in 
even-numbered Congresses.59 With clever political maneuvering, he ensured his election 
to the chair position by delaying the TAB’s first meeting until the next Congress started 
and ensuring that Democratic majority leader Mike Mansfield did not nominate any 
Democrat more senior than him to the TAB.60 TAB members also often abused their right 
to hire new OTA staff by hiring former staffers who had nominally cut ties with them.61 
                                               
57 Ibid 50. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid 52. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid 54. 
17 
Finally, the TAB appointed as the first OTA director ex-Congressman and Democrat 
Emilio Daddario of Connecticut, whose management style prioritized placating TAB 
members.62 
 The departure of Daddario as Director, however, brought reforms and changes of 
philosophy that made the OTA more closely resemble the neutral authority it was 
intended to be. The reforms started with Russell Peterson, whose agenda to increase the 
independence of the OTA from the legislature was so radical that it quickly earned him 
the ire of much of Congress.63 Peterson’s successor, John Gibbons, fired the “favorite 
sons” who maintained loyalties to their legislators and began the practice of sharing study 
requests from Democratic committee chairs with Republican legislators.64 Gibbons 
employed what Bimber calls a “strategy of neutrality” to ensure that the OTA could 
protect its credibility and secure its political survival.65 The allegations of bias were not 
as valid after these reforms. 
 OTA also faces accusations of a similar bias: a technocratic bias toward 
government intervention.66 One former staffer acknowledged that the OTA’s assessment 
process tended to favor federal intervention over market-based and state-level policies.67 
To the extent that this pro-government bias colors the OTA’s research and reports in a 
way that causes them to deviate from rational policymaking (as opposed to the wishes of 
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those harboring anti-government bias), the OTA has access to private-sector expertise in 
the form of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council and assessment-specific panels 
of outside experts to ensure that it gets non-government perspectives on what it studies.68 
Furthermore, the OTA’s heavily reliance on contracted researchers brings provides a 
channel through which those with extensive private-sector experience can create the 
assessments themselves.69 
Coloring the background of these arguments concerning bias within the OTA are 
three facets of its design that would contain any bias: 
1. Reports do not make specific policy recommendations. Rather, they articulate 
policy options and their potential consequences.70 
2. The TAB must approve all assessments before they begin, as well as the budget 
authority to carry out assessments and the release of results to the public after they 
conclude.71 
3. The OTA lacks any policymaking authority. The decision on how to approach the 
issues falls to Congress and the broader federal government. 
Of course, the findings in some reports implied certain policy positions. For 
instance, in a series of three reports, it questioned the feasibility of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative.72 The final report, completed in May of 1988, concluded that the system would 
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destroy “anywhere from a few to a modest fraction” of incoming Soviet missiles.73 
Perceptions of neutrality will virtually always vary, and it is arguably impossible for 
reports to remain perfectly neutral. Descriptions of the potential ramifications of possible 
policy choices may not necessarily involve explicit value judgments, but the mere act of 
describing them is often sufficient to elicit these judgments. Additionally, some 
discretion on how the consequences of different options are represented is inevitable 
because it is impossible to predict every potential effect of a policy. It is worth 
remembering, however, that the OTA’s institutional robustness afforded it a reputation 
that many private-sector sources of expertise cannot match. 
 If the OTA were restored, changing the internal operations can help address 
concerns about bias or the appearance of it. For example, the TAAC took on the narrow 
role of advising on the overall direction of the OTA rather than advising on individual 
assessments as the authorizing legislation envisioned.74 A new OTA might expand the 
role of the TAAC to ensure that private-sector input is taken for individual assessments. 
Using the TAAC to more of its potential is one of many potential modifications to the old 
OTA model that a future technology assessment office might apply. Others include 
incorporation of economic analysis into assessments and making greater use of its 
legislative authority to coordinate with other legislative support agencies.75 In the next 
chapter, I consider these changes and compare my OTA proposal against other 
technology assessment models. 
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Chapter 2: Choosing a Model 
2.1. Summary of Argument 
 I am not alone in my argument to bring back the OTA. Over the years since its 
closure, scholars and politicians have put forth a variety of forms in which technology 
assessment might be carried out once again by Congress. This chapter evaluates these 
models and settles on one that revives the OTA in its original incarnation as a dedicated 
legislative support agency but makes some modifications to update it for today’s political 
environment. 
Some of these models would use other legislative support agencies to fill the gap 
in expertise. But the OTA’s mission was unique among legislative support agencies, and 
not only because it specifically pertained to science and technology. No comparable 
agency was tasked with proactively evaluating the effects of scientific and technological 
developments and providing expertise on them to Congress. This aspect distinguishes the 
OTA from other agencies that initially seem capable of filling in for it, particularly the 
GAO. 
Advocates of using another agency or private entities to fill the gap correctly 
perceive that these other entities overlap with the OTA in some areas. But these areas do 
not indicate that the other bodies can replace the OTA. Rather, they are areas of synergy 
in which a resurrected OTA could coordinate with the other entities to produce 
technology assessment that takes advantage of the strengths of both organizations 
involved. 
21 
2.2. Comparison with the Congressional Research Service 
 Some proposals would resurrect the OTA in a strictly metaphorical sense by 
expanding technology assessment capabilities elsewhere. During the appropriations 
process for FY 1996, Republican Rep. Amo Houghton and Democratic Sen. Ernest 
Hollings introduced proposals in their chambers of Congress that both would have made 
the OTA a subsidiary of the CRS.76 
 Having the CRS absorb the OTA’s functions, however, would not make for 
effective technology assessment. Its primary products are short-term projects that focus 
on gathering and delivering facts. Furthermore, the CRS lacks the scientific and 
technological expertise that a new OTA would have.77 The CRS’s researchers tend to be 
experts in only single domains, making it more difficult to maintain the breadth of 
expertise required to produce effective technology assessment.78 
The Technology Assessment Act of 1972 mandates that the Librarian of Congress 
to make CRS services available to the OTA, implying that it would fit the OTA’s design 
better for CRS to complement it rather than to replace it.79 During its existence, it used 
this partnership in joint efforts such as a 1979 report on satellite communications.80 A 
new OTA might continue to make use of this provision by consulting the CRS for, among 
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other things, quick reviews of the literature to inform its studies and short-term 
deliverables. It would find this collaboration especially valuable if they are short on 
expertise on a certain topic but need only a brief overview of it. By taking advantage of 
the CRS’s speed, it would expedite its technology assessment process and perhaps free up 
resources for the long-term, “early warning” projects for which it is unique among 
legislative support agencies. 
2.3. Comparison with Universities and Private Institutions 
Some have suggested a greater emphasis on partnership with universities and 
nonpartisan NGOs to provide technology assessment.81 This model might be considered a 
refined version of the argument commonly made by fiscal conservatives that private 
organizations are sufficient to inform Congress. It is an improvement on the aggregation-
of-think-tanks idea in that it attempts to address the issue of ideological bias. This idea, 
however, suffers from many of the same flaws as think tanks and lobbyists. Even public 
universities are not immune to bias. Corporate interests have long backed scientific 
studies at universities, taking advantage of their search for new sources of revenue as 
public funding dries up.82 There is no guarantee that the biases of the universities and 
private institutions in this consortium would cancel each other out. Furthermore, the 
private association would still struggle to stay in sync with the congressional agenda. 
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Such an association could exist as a supplement to a second incarnation of the 
OTA. Its main proponent, Richard Sclove of the Woodrow Wilson Center, suggests that 
it can adapt itself to complement any government technology assessment office.83 For the 
OTA, it might provide access to a network of experts to contract for assessments and 
appoint to the TAAC. But it cannot be a substitute for the OTA because it could not 
replicate the OTA’s defining trait: proximity and responsiveness to Congress. 
2.4. Comparison with the Government Accountability Office 
Another form of OTA-in-exile has gained traction over the past two decades: the 
GAO’s science and technology arm. The GAO experiment began in 2001, when 
Congress ordered it to gauge whether it could conduct technology assessment and 
designated a portion of its appropriations to support it.84 Although the GAO has recently 
opened a dedicated technology arm called the Science, Technology Assessment, and 
Analytics Team, it still has only a fraction of the former OTA’s capacity.85 Since 2002, 
when the GAO released its first assessment, the GAO has produced 18 technology 
assessments and 64 other reports.86 The GAO published all but one of these other reports 
in 2017 and 2018.87 For reference, the OTA produced 750 assessments over its 23 years, 
                                               
83 Sclove 40. 
84 Blair 73. 
85 “Our New Science, Technology Assessment and Analytics Team,” Government Accountability Office, 
Jan 29, 2019, https://blog.gao.gov/2019/01/29/our-new-science-technology-assessment-and-analytics-
team/. 
86 “Science and Technology,” Government Accountability Office, accessed March 5, 2019, 
https://www.gao.gov/technology_and_science#t=1. 
87 Ibid. 
24 
before the modern Internet and other computing technology that has streamlined the 
assessment process since 1995.88 
 The GAO pilot program continues today. Some have proposed expanding the 
technology assessment arm further to create a full OTA-sized office within the GAO. 
Indeed, the GAO itself has requested $58 million in additional appropriations for FY 
2020, much of it intended to expand its newly formed Science, Technology, Assessment 
and Analytics Team.89 The idea at first seems promising because the GAO’s mission 
overlaps somewhat with that of the OTA. Some policy decisions informed by 
assessments, such as the withholding of appropriations from the Social Security 
Administration in 1994, specifically pertain to cost savings. 
But expanding the GAO’s science and technology arm would leave structural and 
cultural differences from the old OTA that would complicate technology assessment. 
Because the GAO’s mission emphasizes analysis of existing government programs with 
cost reduction in mind, its technology assessment may exhibit a bias toward policy issues 
on which the federal government has already intervened.90 Further, the fundamental 
differences between technology assessment and the GAO’s usual auditing work may give 
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rise to cultural inertia within the GAO that would complicate adaptation to the 
assessment process.91 
To their credit, GAO reports often concern emerging technologies such as 
artificial intelligence.92 But they are thinner on policy options than those of the OTA, 
signaling further than they serve fundamentally different purposes. For example, a 2018 
GAO assessment on artificial intelligence outlines considerations and general objectives 
for policymakers but is light on specific policy proposals and their potential 
consequences.93 The AI report explores multiple applications of AI.94 In one section 
devoted to policy considerations for regulating autonomous vehicles, the report provides 
expert opinions on what regulation of these vehicles should accomplish and 
considerations to remember when developing regulations.95 But only rarely are specific 
regulatory approaches evaluated. 
Recent GAO technology assessments on the Internet of Things and medical 
technology show a similar pattern.96 The Internet of Things report, at times, is more 
specific than the AI report on the standards that regulations should enforce. For example, 
on privacy issues, the report takes as a model the Fair Information Practices (FIPs) 
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developed by the U.S. government and later by the OECD.97 These practices include the 
relevance of collected data to their stated purpose and public availability of information 
on privacy policies and practices.98 But the assessment still lacks the evaluation of 
different possible regulatory approaches to privacy that an OTA assessment might have. 
Overall, GAO assessments seem to mostly provide background information on 
technology issues and outline broad principles for regulation to follow. Though OTA 
reports also once served this purpose, they also provided a “menu” of specific policy 
options and described each option’s potential effects with a depth that GAO assessments 
seem to lack. 
Contrast the GAO reports with OTA assessments, which gauge the viability of 
different specific congressional actions. For instance, the cholesterol screening report I 
mention in Chapter 1 contains a section that analyzes the implications of cholesterol 
screenings for Medicare and provides cost estimates for Medicare coverage of the 
screenings.99 
The expanded-GAO model has a few advantages. For instance, the GAO’s 
relative insulation from Congress might protect it from political threats that a second 
incarnation of the OTA might face. But the OTA’s governance can be adapted to 
reinforce protections of the independence of technology assessments. After all, it is easier 
to make changes to an agency that does not yet exist than to one that does. Further, the 
GAO’s relative insulation from Congress has its downside in that it weakens its 
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connection with Congress. Without a TAB-like body to direct its resources toward policy 
issues on the congressional agenda, the influence of the GAO’s technology assessment 
over legislative policymaking weakens. 
The absence of a TAB-like structure within the GAO to act as a gatekeeper for 
technology assessments may also speed up the assessment process.100 Although speed is 
important, a new OTA could streamline its old process by taking advantage of 
technological advancements since 1995 and by producing short-term deliverables and 
interim reports. 
Furthermore, the assessment process at the GAO reflects its fundamentally 
different mission and structure. Although assessments start with a bipartisan letter from 
multiple members of Congress, Congress has little control over the process after the 
assessment is begun.101 The GAO may indeed be quicker with technology assessments 
and be exposed to less political pressure. But these advantages come at the cost of a 
defining feature of any legislative support agency: alignment with Congress’s needs. 
Even though the TAB is a layer of bureaucracy, it ensures that the final product fulfills 
this part of the OTA’s mission. This weak connection with Congress illustrates where the 
missions of the GAO and the OTA diverge. 
The breadth of some GAO reports, such as the AI assessment, may be a response 
to the GAO’s looser connection to Congress’s desires. If the report covers a wider range 
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of technology issues, the probability is higher that Congress will find some part of the 
report relevant. But with limited resources to conduct assessments, breadth can come at 
the expense of depth. In contrast, a second OTA could carry out a narrowly focused 
assessment (e.g., on the use of AI-based facial recognition technology by law 
enforcement) with confidence that Congress would find it relevant because of its more 
direct connection with the congressional agenda through the Technology Assessment 
Board. 
Governance is not the only area in which the GAO may need to be restructured to 
fill the same gap in oversight and expertise that the OTA would. The OTA relied heavily 
on contracted outside experts who could be retained as expert witnesses for hearings and 
resources for congressional staff. It commonly assembled assessment-specific advisory 
panels to critique its research.102 The GAO has consulted with outside experts for its 
assessments with the help of the National Academies, but its process is not mature and 
may not be as conducive to retaining them as resources for congressional staff as the 
OTA’s process was.103 The GAO also lacks a TAAC-like body, though it is at this 
writing in the process of establishing one.104  
The GAO’s peer review processes are maturing, but it remains to be seen whether 
they will play the same role as those of the OTA. Expanding the GAO may, to be sure, 
help close the gap between the GAO and the OTA in this area by granting it more 
resources to hire more experts and build deeper relationships with outside experts. But 
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this kind of peer review is not part of GAO’s typical auditing work; that process involves 
comments from federal agencies rather than outside experts.105 Structural and cultural 
differences, even with expansion, may cause complications. 
As with the CRS, the OTA’s enabling legislation stipulates that the GAO make its 
services available to the OTA.106 Collaboration between the two legislative support 
agencies on a policy issue that involves both technology and government accounting, 
such as defense procurement, would likely achieve higher-quality research and better 
policy than if either agency worked alone. 
None of the arguments in this section hold that the GAO cannot provide 
technology expertise. But they support the contention that an expanded GAO would not 
fulfill the same role as the OTA once did. 
The best argument for replicating the OTA’s functions within the GAO is perhaps 
its relative political feasibility. The GAO’s high reputation among both parties in 
Congress would make it easier to increase the GAO’s appropriations than to take out 
appropriations for a new agency. Namely, the GAO does not face the same perceptions 
among conservatives of liberal bias as the OTA did. 
Though political feasibility weighs on virtually any policy proposal, among its 
disadvantages as a criterion for judging policies is that it is difficult to project into the 
future, especially when elected officials whose makeup can change quickly are involved. 
The general political environment, including the makeup of Congress, could 
unexpectedly change in a way that favors restoring funds to the OTA.  
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I might face criticism for skipping a step in getting from where we are now, with 
no OTA, to a new OTA adapted to today’s technical policy issues and political climate. 
But I am not ignoring the necessity of passing an OTA-funding appropriations bill and an 
amendment to the Technology Assessment Act of 1972 into law. I choose a model 
resembling the old OTA over a GAO-based scheme in spite of the relative political 
feasibility of the latter because I contend that the former would provide more effective 
technology assessment. 
At least one scholar has pondered how the GAO’s structure might be changed to 
accommodate these concerns and capture the strengths of the OTA model.107 One early 
effort led by Rep. Rush Holt in 2004 would have recreated the OTA structure, complete 
with a TAB, within the GAO.108 But it is easier to make changes to an organizational 
structure that does not exist than to one that does. Any structural changes to the GAO 
would encounter institutional and cultural inertia that would complicate their 
implementation. On the other hand, a resurrected OTA could begin operations under a 
different model relatively easily. The next section discusses some changes that might be 
made to the old OTA structure to improve its political robustness. 
2.5. Possible Modifications to the Old OTA Model 
If the OTA should be brought back in its original structure as a standalone 
agency, would it be the same as it was in 1995? Advances in technology since then would 
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certainly change how a resurrected OTA would operate. The modern Internet would 
expedite the research process, making it possible to carry out technology assessments 
more quickly and at a lower cost. What research a new OTA would make public could 
also reach a wider audience, particularly academics. 
But the old OTA’s structure contributed to its fall. Its constituency was too small 
to protect it from closure in part because its services were accessible only by committee 
leadership. This lack of brand recognition within Congress is part of the OTA’s general 
lack of public visibility, explained in part by its small size. One director joked that among 
congressional institutions, the OTA was “larger only than the U.S. Botanic Gardens.”109 
The OTA’s obscurity among rank-and-file Congress members inhibited these members 
from rallying to its defense when the Republican Revolution’s “Cutting Congress First” 
campaign came for it.110 Its obscurity to the public prevented constituents from 
pressuring their legislators into doing so. 
To improve political survivability, a new OTA would need to retain the support of 
a broader constituency within Congress. There are many possible changes that might 
achieve this aim. One discussion draft submitted by Rep. Jason Chaffetz, a Republican, 
during his last term in Congress proposed allowing any member of Congress to request 
“information, reports, studies, findings, notes, and background papers, compiled in 
carrying out technology assessment.”111 
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Consider the logic behind restricting study requests to committee chairs. In 1972, 
Rep. Charles Mosher introduced and pushed through an amendment to the OTA’s 
enabling legislation that specified that only committee chairs could request studies on the 
suspicion that junior members might use the OTA’s resources to challenge their more 
senior colleagues.112 This restriction empowered committee leadership at a time when 
power was gradually moving away from committees toward party leaders. 
Allowing all members of Congress to request materials from previous technology 
assessments strikes a compromise between this protection of committee power and 
constituency expansion because it would allow wider access to the OTA’s work without 
granting wider control over OTA resources. 
Lawmakers might, as previously mentioned, modify the OTA’s governance 
structure to protect the independence of its assessment process. The heightened political 
polarization of Congress and the country as a whole, especially since 1995, raises the risk 
of partisan hijacking. 
The TAB only withheld one study because of its content over the OTA’s 23 years, 
though it sometimes insisted on rewording conclusions and other changes to language 
that members found too pointed.113 In one case, Sen. Ernest Hollings voted to authorize 
the release of a study on the textile industry, a key economic activity in his state of South 
Carolina, but issued a press release that criticized the same study’s policy options.114 In 
today’s Congress, however, the assumption that TAB members will as easily separate 
their partisanship from their role is not a safe one. The fixed balanced party 
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representation on the TAB does much to mitigate the threat of partisanship. But the TAB 
still remains vulnerable to bias, especially if members would still be appointed by the 
Speaker of the House and the president pro tempore, both majority-party positions. When 
appointing members of the opposite party to the TAB, there would exist an incentive to 
appoint the Congress members ideologically closest to their own party. For example, a 
Republican president pro tempore might appoint the most moderate Democratic senators. 
Some federal advisory bodies, such as the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 
have similar appointment processes to that of the TAB.115 A redesign of this procedure 
would have some other models against which to compare. 
We might consider changing the threshold to authorize the release of assessment 
results to make it more difficult for TAB members to suppress assessments whose 
findings are unfavorable to their policy preferences. But simply lowering the threshold 
would reduce Congress’s ability to keep the OTA’s products close to Congress’s needs 
because it would weaken the TAB’s leverage to demand changes to how assessments 
present findings. Perhaps it may be better to require that any vote to block the release of 
study results have the backing of at least two members of both parties. This restriction 
would provide insurance against a scenario where a single member of one party votes 
with all six members of the opposite party to block the release of study results for 
partisan reasons. The TAB would retain its leverage over the packaging of findings, but 
the risk is lower that it would use this power for partisan reasons. 
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A partnership with the CBO might prove especially powerful. Though the OTA 
had in-house economists, the expertise of the CBO would allow the incorporation of 
economic analysis into a broader range of studies and strengthen the menu of policy 
options characteristic of OTA reports by allowing analysis of the budgetary implications 
of different options.116 The CBO has the expertise to undertake this collaboration, as 
evidenced by its previous work on areas such as federal tax credits for electric vehicles 
and energy subsidies.117 Economic analysis would be key to building a constituency 
around a new OTA because it would further establish its reputation as a facilitator for 
cost savings opportunities. It could also help the second incarnation of the OTA’s 
political feasibility and survivability by providing a vector through which free-market 
policy ideas could be fairly considered and added to the menu of options, which would 
address fears of liberal and pro-government bias. 
The TAAC, though originally intended in part to provide external input on 
assessment findings, reviewed and gave input on the organizational direction of the 
OTA.118 A new OTA could also use TAAC for purposes more consistent with its original 
intent by, for example, running over a list of prospective assessment topics to ensure that 
they are in the broad U.S. social interest. Doing so would ensure that the OTA’s research 
agenda is not only in line with Congress’s needs but also with what outside experts 
perceive as the interest of the U.S. as a whole. As OTA Director, Russell Peterson 
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attempted to fashion OTA’s agenda based on an OTA-generated priorities list presented 
to TAAC.119 But he made this list without approval from the TAB, which made relations 
with Congress tense and led to his resignation.120 Joint meetings between the TAB and 
the TAAC could help foster communication on research priorities between the two 
bodies. 
Some changes might especially help the political feasibility of resurrecting the 
OTA. In the next chapter, I discuss the current political environment on the prospects of 
creating and maintaining a new OTA and discuss how these changes might be useful in 
defending such a proposal from political attacks. 
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Chapter 3: Political Strategy 
3.1. Failed Attempts to Revive the OTA 
Since 1995, OTA advocates have tried and failed multiple times to restore 
funding. The most recent attempt at this writing came in June of 2018, when a Rep. Mark 
Takano (D-CA) amendment to an appropriations bill failed on a 195-217 party-line 
vote.121 15 Republicans voted for the amendment, and 6 Democrats against it.122 The 
amendment would have provided only $2.5 million for the OTA, or less than 10% of its 
original budget.123 The failure of even these modest appropriations makes the political 
task of restoring the OTA seem especially daunting. The Takano amendment saw better 
performance than a similar amendment from Rush Holt (D-NJ) in 2014, which failed 164 
to 248.124 That amendment also would have provided $2.5 million.125 
The rhetoric used in the floor debate on the Takano amendment provides some 
insight into what arguments are used today in support of or opposition to restoring the 
OTA. The amendment's opposition relied on the argument that the OTA would be 
redundant with the GAO.126 Though Section 2.4 confronts the substance of this argument, 
its appearance here points to a deep-rooted difficulty in restoring the OTA. Indeed, the 
fiscal conservatives who got the OTA defunded in 1995 relied heavily on arguments that 
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the OTA overlapped too much with other legislative support agencies and private 
institutions to be worth paying for.127 
The most tangible examples of Congress benefitting from the OTA often involve 
cost savings. The Social Security computer procurement example and the cholesterol 
example from Chapter 1 come to mind. These applications of the OTA’s expertise mirror 
the role of the GAO, making the OTA appear to overlap with the GAO’s core mission. 
This line of reasoning leads to the implication that some supporters of the expanded-
GAO model may agree that the GAO cannot replicate the OTA’s proactivity. Rather, 
they may only value the OTA for its potential to produce assessments that lead to cost 
savings with government programs --- precisely the GAO’s domain. 
Furthermore, the Takano amendment would have provided barely enough funding 
to establish a small OTA whose assessment-producing capacity might be closer to that of 
the GAO. In other words, attempts at revival that would make only modest requests for 
appropriations may be more vulnerable to the objection that they would be redundant 
with the GAO’s science and technology arm. 
The challenge in countering the redundancy argument lies in that what 
distinguishes the OTA from the GAO is less easily conveyable in political messaging. As 
articulated in Chapter 1, bad policies and missed opportunities demonstrate the need for 
greater technological expertise within Congress. 
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But the OTA’s unique duty is to inform Congress on, as one former staffer put it, 
“termites-in-the-basement problems” rather than “wolf-at-the-door problems.”128 
Combined with the limitation of its influence to the early stages of the policy process, the 
absence of the OTA does not necessarily lead to choosing the wrong policy for a given 
issue because the OTA does not recommend specific policies. Rather, its absence 
contributes to more subtle manifestations of bad policy, as with SOPA/PIPA, or to 
congressional inaction. In the case of SOPA/PIPA, many key lawmakers backed a flawed 
policy because they were not sufficiently informed of its flaws. But, if examined in a 
vacuum, this case does not make it clear that a revived OTA would have solved the 
problem any better than an upgraded CRS or an augmented congressional staff corps. 
Rather, it is congressional inaction that the OTA would be in a unique position to 
prevent. The GAO’s structure, culture, and mission, as I argue in Chapter 2, distance it 
from the foresight required to inform Congress on emerging issues. But the result of 
congressional inaction is that Congress acts too late, not necessarily that it takes the 
wrong action given the circumstances. It is widely acknowledged and often taken as 
given that government institutions, particularly democratic deliberative ones such as 
Congress, are often slow to respond to societal problems as they emerge. For Congress, 
some (rightly) see slowness as a necessary evil to ensure that deliberation remains 
democratic. But many policy issues become more severe and difficult to address the 
longer the government leaves them unaddressed. Climate change comes to mind. 
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These “termites-in-the-basement problems” inevitably compete for political 
attention with “wolf-at-the-door problems” that are more urgent but not necessarily more 
severe. In Congress, where lawmakers have many short-term goals such as reelection, 
long-term policy issues often remain neglected. 
If expertise on long-term problems stops flowing into Congress, nothing 
immediately goes awry. This lack of immediate downside to the cessation of OTA’s 
assessments is a key reason that fiscal conservatives consider the OTA expendable. In 
1995, many OTA critics’ arguments did not rely on attacking the OTA’s merits; they 
often praised its work.129 Rather, they portrayed the OTA as unaffordable in a time of 
fiscal crisis.130 
OTA advocates seem to be making more effort to counter the redundancy 
argument immediately in their rhetoric. In an April 2019 appropriations hearing, Rep. 
Takano changed his opening statement from the floor debate on his amendment to 
emphasize that “no other entity has the capacity or expertise” to fill the OTA’s role.131 
Outside of waiting for a more OTA-friendly government, which the 2018 midterm 
elections have brought in the form of a Democratic House, how might future attempts at 
revival be informed by past failures? To fully answer this question, it is necessary to 
review the attacks on the OTA during its lifespan and some changes in the political 
climate since 1995. 
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3.2. Background on Attacks on the OTA During its Lifespan 
The successful effort to zero the OTA’s appropriations came as part of the 
Republican “Cutting Congress First” campaign outlined by a December 1994 resolution 
passed by the Senate Republican Conference.132 The resolution also called for budget 
cuts to committees and the other legislative support agencies.133 In the budget process for 
FY 1996, both budget committees formalized the zeroing of OTA’s appropriations in 
their budget resolutions.134 
The OTA’s small size and constituency made it an easy target. Fiscal 
conservatives relished the idea of abolishing an entire agency to signal that they were so 
disciplined that they were willing to completely eliminate one of their resources. 
Freshmen Republicans elected in 1994, a key part of the coalition that zeroed the OTA’s 
funding, had little prior exposure to the OTA and thus did not have time to warm to it, as 
some more senior Republicans did. Peter Blair points out that in the 104th Congress, 
about 32 percent of House Republicans and about 20 percent of Senate Republicans were 
first-term lawmakers.135 
The OTA’s low profile also meant that debate over its future was drowned out by 
much larger debates over healthcare, welfare, and other areas of government spending 
where the new Republican majority sought to cut budgets.136 Many of the OTA’s backers 
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scrambled to prevent budget cuts to these other government programs, causing the OTA 
to fall down their lists of priorities.137 
Though the OTA fell in 1995, it had survived legislative attacks before. Shortly 
after the 1980 election, the OTA survived a defunding attempt led by newly elected 
Senator Mack Mattingly (R-GA), then chair of two key subcommittees: the Legislative 
Branch subcommittee of Appropriations and the Congressional Operations and Oversight 
subcommittee of Governmental Affairs.138 
Three TAB members, including then-Chair Ted Stevens (R-AK), sat on the 
Appropriations subcommittee.139 Stevens rallied senators behind the OTA by soliciting 
letters of support from the new Republican committee chairs.140 He and the other two 
TAB members, Senators Mark Hatfield and Ernest Hollings, managed to preserve two 
thirds of the OTA’s funding in the subcommittee and restored most of the cut funding in 
the full committee and on the floor.141 
Mattingly also tried to deauthorize the OTA in 1982 through the Congressional 
Operations and Oversight subcommittee by organizing an oversight hearing.142 But 
Senator Charles Mathias (R-MD), chair of the Rules Committee and TAB member, 
preempted Mattingly’s hearing with his own in which he brought in pro-OTA witnesses 
such as Rep. George Brown (D-CA), OTA Director John Gibbons, and representatives 
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from the National Science Foundation and advocacy groups.143 With this oversight 
hearing on the record, Mattingly abandoned his plans.144 
The “Mattingly affair,” as OTA staff often called it, presents an intuitive but 
important lesson: a new OTA should have friends in high places to protect it.145 The key 
roles of Ted Stevens and Charles Mathias highlight the importance of Republican buy-in. 
3.3. Changes in the Political Climate since 1995 
In many ways, the political climate has changed since 1995 in ways that would 
make it more difficult to create and sustain a new OTA. Heightened political polarization 
has increased the appetite for ideology over truth. 
This trend may be the most stubborn obstacle to any return of the OTA. It has 
made itself especially prominent within the Republican Party, in which a populist distrust 
of experts has gained dominance over the party’s rhetoric. This undercurrent is what 
makes it more difficult to assemble a pro-OTA coalition similar to the one that defended 
it from Mack Mattingly. Any effort at revival would likely require significant Republican 
support. Advocates for a new OTA might consider arguments for revival that align with 
political conservatism. For example, OTA assessments might make overregulation less 
likely by preventing the passage of misinformed policies.146 Hawkish Republicans might 
be receptive to the potential of the OTA to improve the national defense. 
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The specter of partisanship also presents a complication to the comparison of the 
OTA model against an expanded-GAO model. In that comparison, there seems to be a 
tradeoff between independence and responsiveness to Congress. As articulated in Section 
2.4, the GAO’s assessment process seems too independent from congressional input to 
fill the same role that the OTA’s work did. But in an environment where the danger of 
politicization of expertise is so high, might it be wise to err on the side of independence? 
Perhaps it may. But, once again, the OTA model can be reworked to fortify protections 
from political intrusion because it does not yet exist. Changes to already-existing 
institutions encounter resistance that changes to non-existent ones do not. 
Power has shifted away from committees toward party leadership, which may 
give party leaders reason to be concerned that a second incarnation of the OTA would 
provide a vector through which committees could challenge them. As evidenced by 
Democratic leadership’s support for restoring the OTA, this concern does not seem to be 
critical.147 But it may encourage party leaders to shape a new OTA to ensure that they 
maintain control over the party. 
There are some forces that might increase the urgency some might attribute to 
informing Congress on technology issues. The development of the modern Internet has 
given a new dimension to technology issues, with wide-ranging debates over net 
neutrality and cybersecurity coming to the forefront of public political consciousness. 
These issues provide OTA advocates rhetorical ammunition, especially when they expose 
Congress’s lack of expertise as the Zuckerberg and Pichai hearings did.  
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Additionally, the geopolitical position of the U.S. may affect the OTA’s 
prospects. In 1995, the U.S. had recently witnessed the disintegration of its chief 
geopolitical rival, the Soviet Union. Today, however, there is a growing sentiment that 
the U.S. is in a technological arms race with China. China hawks might become more 
amenable to bringing back the OTA as a means of ensuring that the U.S. can remain 
technologically and economically competitive. The heightened attention to cybersecurity 
in the past several years, particularly around issues of election security, may provide 
rhetoric with which to promote the OTA. 
I outline these helpful forces to point to possible avenues that the political rhetoric 
of future pro-OTA efforts might follow. Some of them already make regular appearances 
in expressions of support for rebuilding the OTA.148 
3.4. What Might We Do to Help Bring Back and Maintain the OTA? 
 Combining what we know about the battles over OTA’s funding with what we 
know about the current political climate, what lessons might OTA advocates learn? 
Because OTA support and opposition hews closely to party lines, Republican 
OTA advocates would be an important part of a successful pro-OTA coalition. 
Supportive think tanks, particularly non-liberal ones such as R Street Institute, will likely 
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be a key part of any coalition that would get OTA restored.149 One AEI scholar has come 
out in favor of revival.150 
Hearings present opportunities to educate members of Congress, particularly 
newly elected lawmakers, on the role the OTA once played and its importance. In his 
opening remarks to the 1982 Senate Rules and Administration Committee hearing, 
Mathias acknowledged this kind of opportunity by stating that “it is important that OTA’s 
performance be examined and explained to those Members who may not be sufficiently 
aware of its work.”151 
Some of the modifications proposed in Chapter 2 might improve the political 
prospects of restoring funding to the OTA. For example, a greater emphasis on economic 
analysis and more collaboration with the CBO might convince some conservatives and 
libertarians that market-oriented policy ideas would be fairly represented.152 A greater 
emphasis on interim reports and other short-term deliverables would address a key 
criticism of the old OTA: the long delays of its assessments that sometimes resulted in 
them being completed after relevant legislation had been considered. This issue is 
especially important for making a revived-OTA proposal competitive with GAO 
expansion models because timeliness, as I discuss in Section 2.4., is one of the 
advantages that GAO-expansion advocates claim. 
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The defense of the OTA from the efforts of Mack Mattingly in the early 1980s 
may be an argument for expanding the TAB to increase the number of potential OTA 
defenders in positions of high influence within Congress. Even before the OTA would be 
restored, the proposal to add more TAB members might warm some lawmakers toward 
restoration because it would counteract the narrative that the OTA would operate only for 
the benefit of the select few TAB members. More cynically, the possibility or promise of 
a TAB seat might motivate some to support resurrecting the OTA as a means of 
expanding their own soft power. 
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Chapter 4: Far-Reaching Consequences 
4.1. The OTA and Congressional Oversight 
The founding ethos of the OTA emphasized its utility as a means of verifying 
claims made by executive agencies. Its creation in the early 1970s took place with a 
backdrop of tension between Congress and the Nixon administration.153 The creation of 
the OTA was part of a broad expansion of legislative support agencies, which included 
the creation of the CBO and the expansion of the GAO and the CRS.154 There had been a 
growing sense that Congress was falling behind the executive branch in technological 
expertise, hampering its oversight capacity and making it dependent on the bureaucracy 
for facts and figures.155 As Democratic Rep. Vic Fazio put it in 1995 when defending the 
OTA, “The Department of Energy will tell you [their policy] is the greatest thing since 
sliced bread. We need someone who will tell you the opposite.”156 
 Restoring the OTA would be a key step in restoring Congress’s oversight 
capacity. Congress has engaged in a well-documented delegation of its authority to the 
executive branch. This delegation has most famously taken place with Congress’s war 
power, but there are other examples of it that more directly relate to policy areas that a 
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new OTA might provide expertise on.157 For example, current law allows the President 
emergency powers for situations such as public health emergencies.158 Some types of 
national threats, such those to security caused by a hostile foreign power, can also be 
technology-adjacent because science and technology issues can be a key component of 
the emergency (e.g., cybersecurity threats to the nation’s critical infrastructure). 
 As President Trump’s border emergency has demonstrated, Congress plays an 
important role in overseeing the use of emergency powers to guard against their abuse. 
To exercise this oversight, Congress needs expertise independent of the executive branch 
to understand the situation and determine if abuse is occurring. Even in situations where 
timeliness is critical, the OTA can prove useful for two reasons. First, it would likely 
provide short-term deliverables and consultations that could be completed at a moment’s 
notice. Second, assessments on topics germane to emergency situations (e.g., 
cybersecurity) can be carried out and circulated before the situation arises. These 
circumstances are where the OTA’s unique duty as a congressional crow’s nest, scanning 
the horizon for challenges and threats, prove especially pertinent. 
 There is another sense in which strengthening congressional oversight would 
improve governance. As discussed in Section 1.3., executive agencies’ delegation of 
regulatory authority to the private interests that they are tasked with regulating has 
allowed those private interests to capture those agencies. If Congress can conduct 
oversight hearings armed with OTA research, it will be better able to press executive 
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agencies on the effects of this delegation. These hearings may also help bring public 
attention to the regulatory capture, improving the chances of remedy. 
4.2. OTA Research as a Contribution to Academic Literature 
Not all of the value of OTA assessments would come in the form of more 
informed congressional actions. They stand as scholarly works in their own right, 
providing direction and support for future academic research on technology. The OTA 
and private researchers could gradually build off of each other’s research. Additionally, 
researchers in private industry could treat the overall body of OTA work as a repository 
to consult for information on what research has been done in their areas of interest. This 
function would make private research more efficient by preventing overlap between 
researchers.159 
The OTA’s short-term deliverables, which would be more conducive to 
consumption by congressional staff, would also prove a valuable resource to staffers and 
other particularly time-starved Capitol Hill professionals. They may help reduce the 
strain caused by the understaffing of Congress. 
4.3. How the OTA Might Empower Committees 
A new OTA would also change a different power dynamic: that between 
congressional committee leadership and party leadership. Since the 1970s, power has 
been shifting away from committees toward party leadership. This trend accelerated in 
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the 1990s, when Newt Gingrich imposed six-year term limits on House committee chairs 
in his party.160 As of 2015, committee staff headcount has fallen by one third from where 
it was in 1993.161 Committee authorizations peaked during the first two years of the 
Obama administration, when Congress was under unified Democratic control, but have 
fallen by 34% in the House and 26% in the Senate since then.162 
The dwindling presence of committees has shifted the legislative process. 
Committees meet less frequently than they did as recently as 2006.163 An increasing 
proportion of bills reach the floor without seeing a committee hearing or markup.164 The 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 is a prominent example.165 Party leadership has filled the 
power vacuum left by the committees, contributing to the rise of a legislative process that 
increasingly seems to prioritize political messaging over policymaking. The composition 
of the committee staff corps reflects this shift; an increasing proportion of staffers have 
titles and duties related to communications and campaigning rather than policy.166 
The OTA would empower committee leaders by giving them expertise that they 
may be able to use to reassert their agenda-setting power. Through their study requests, 
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they may foster more policymaking in committees by releasing the reports there. Even 
though OTA assessments make no policy recommendations, they provide the background 
information necessary to begin considering policies and a menu of options from which to 
get started. In other words, they would expedite the early stages of the policy process so 
that policy issues that might have otherwise remained neglected have a chance to be 
addressed in legislation informed by the OTA analysis. 
Furthermore, the committees that a new OTA might serve most frequently also 
tend to have higher staff turnover, meaning that they are especially pressed for policy 
expertise. The House Energy and Commerce Committee, which made the most study 
requests of any committee to the OTA between 1980 and 1995, has the second shortest 
average committee tenure in the House at 3.6 years.167 The next two most frequent OTA 
clients, House Science and what is now Senate HELP (Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions), have average tenures between 4 and 4.5 years but still rank in the bottom half 
among the committees in their chambers.168 
To be sure, there are many other institutional obstacles to committee power that 
the OTA would do little to address. For example, it is well-known among House 
Republicans that term limits on committee chairs have inhibited the development of deep 
policy expertise.169 Additionally, the steering committee that appoints new committee 
leadership in the Republican Party is dominated by party leadership.170 In both parties, 
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committee leadership falls under heavy fundraising pressure from party leadership.171 But 
the OTA would provide a vector through which policies could pass into committees, 
opening them to committee processes that could foster more productive policymaking. 
Other barriers to such productive policymaking would certainly need to be cleared. 
Perhaps the revival of the OTA might accompany a broader package of congressional 
reforms. 
4.4. Competition of a Revived OTA with Other Sources of Expertise 
A second incarnation of the OTA might displace other vectors of science and 
technology expertise into Congress. The most obvious redundancy would be with the 
GAO, which might retain some of its experts to collaborate with the new OTA on 
assessments where the GAO’s strength would create synergy. The GAO’s new 
technology team has several stated functions other than technology assessment, such as 
audits of government technology programs and establishing an audit innovation lab.172 Its 
existing resources for technology assessment might be redirected into these activities, 
which hew more closely to the GAO’s mission. 
But the OTA would also alleviate pressure on overworked alternative sources of 
information, particularly the CRS and congressional staff. Admittedly, almost any of the 
models I compare the OTA against in Chapter 2 would, given more funding and 
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resources, free up resources elsewhere by overlapping with other sources of expertise. 
But this effect would partially mitigate the cost of the OTA. 
OTA products would compete with those of think tanks and lobbyists. Because 
OTA assessments lack the partisan agenda of think tank reports and lobbyists’ pitches, 
the information flowing into Congress on science and technology issues might become 
more objective to the extent that the new OTA would displace think tanks and lobbyists. 
As mentioned in Section 1.3., reducing congressional dependence on lobbyists 
would benefit governance in many ways. While we must remain realistic about the 
magnitude of these positive effects from OTA revival alone, a less biased flow of 
information into Congress would be a necessary ingredient to less biased policymaking. 
Lobbying may become slightly less fruitful for those private interests that engage in it, 
potentially redirecting lobbying expenditures toward more economically productive 
activities. 
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Conclusion 
 At this writing, the CRS and the National Academy of Public Administration 
(NAPA) are compiling a report ordered by the FY 2019 legislative branch appropriations 
bill on the science and technology assessment expertise available to Congress.173 The 
report will reportedly be finished in October 2019.174 
 I have laid out a case for reviving the OTA, justifying a second incarnation of the 
OTA over other models of technology assessment. I have laid out political obstacles that 
have faced previous efforts to restore the OTA, and how future efforts might be informed 
by them. I have fortified my case for a new OTA by elaborating on some of the indirect 
benefits it may bring to the federal government and the U.S. as a whole. The NAPA 
report may echo some of my arguments. 
 In making my case, I have taken a somewhat different direction from many others 
who have pondered the form in which Congress might bulk up its technology expertise. 
In particular, I have suggested that the OTA model can be improved to address concerns 
about it, especially those expressed by proponents of expanding the GAO to fill the gap 
left by the defunding of the OTA. 
 There will be logistical obstacles in building a new OTA and setting it to work. 
Science and technology experts are difficult to come by today, especially considering the 
allure of Silicon Valley.175 The position of OTA Director is uniquely difficult to fill 
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because it requires a rare combination of technical expertise and political savvy. The new 
OTA would need to build trust and relationships with members of Congress, meaning 
that funding and staff would likely start at modest levels and gradually ramp up. Finally, 
the OTA is only one part of a larger body of reforms needed to restore Congress’s brains. 
Even with a new OTA, Congress would still exhibit some of its ignorance and unhealthy 
dependence on interest groups without upgrades to its atrophied staff corps. 
 It may feel surprising to recall that the OTA would have no policymaking power. 
As a principle, it would not make value judgments. For example, an OTA report might 
articulate how a government program could expand its operations if granted $5 million in 
additional funding. But that report cannot make a judgment on whether that $5 million 
might be better spent elsewhere. It falls to Congress to prioritize government spending. 
 This neutrality may cause fear that Congress might use the OTA to rationalize bad 
policy decisions just as often as it does to inform good ones. OTA reports cannot prevent 
all bad policies from being approved by Congress. But they can prevent misinformed 
policies. The value neutrality of OTA products makes them an imperfect but useful 
separator of facts from opinions. 
Further, by including the menu of policy options and articulating their possible 
consequences, OTA assessments would frame policy debates in a way that nudges 
Congress toward certain policy options over others. For instance, an OTA report might 
find that a widely popular policy would likely have previously underacknowledged side 
effects that are widely viewed as undesirable. The report cannot state that these effects 
are undesirable. But it has provided information that leads to the value judgment that 
those outcomes are not desirable. Some have compared the OTA to a tutor, and aptly 
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so.176 Like a tutor, the OTA would not be there to supply answers. Its purpose would be 
to supply the information and conceptual frameworks needed to reach the answers. As 
pointed out in Section 2.4, GAO technology assessments do not include a menu of 
options. If anything, they are more vulnerable to being used to rationalize bad policy 
decisions. 
Some may have a visceral hostile instinct against the OTA because they may see 
it as a kind of technocracy. The value-neutrality I outline demonstrates that the OTA 
would not be a technocratic body in the sense that it causes the will of a small group of 
elite experts to usurp the democratic will. Instead, it would help the democratically 
elected Congress make better policy decisions to serve the citizenry. As argued in 
Chapter 2, the OTA model does more to ensure responsiveness and accountability to 
Congress than some other alternative technology assessment models. The expanded-GAO 
model, for example, might be considered more technocratic because of its looser 
connection with the congressional agenda. 
The OTA’s bipartisan governance by the TAB not only distinguishes it from other 
governance models for legislative support agencies but also symbolizes the OTA’s role as 
a source of common factual ground on which to base political discourse. The approval of 
OTA assessments signals that Congress accepts the facts within the assessments. It will 
take more than a new OTA to catch Congress up on technological developments, let 
alone restore the separation between ideology and fact. But the OTA would provide a 
venue where this separation can happen. 
                                               
176 Kim Zetter, “Of Course Congress Is Clueless About Tech—It Killed Its Tutor,” Wired, April 21, 2016, 
https://www.wired.com/2016/04/office-technology-assessment-congress-clueless-tech-killed-tutor/. 
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